Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd (1989) by Starks, Michael
    Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989) 
     Michael Starks 
        ABSTRACT 
A superb effort but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) 
is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the 
modern dual systems of thought view and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality to have grasped him 
completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary 
Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out (e.g., in my recent 
articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless he does a good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston 
(Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the 
book(p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the 
denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such words, is not 
the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its 
ultimate foundation.” 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W as I explain here and in my 
other reviews. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view 
may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those 
interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature 
and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted 
by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might give the 
name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; however, but rather 
observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation 
of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the nature of the fact 
reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations?...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid fact-
value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC 
p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, are created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to 
recognize a reason for action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the 
acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because 
they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of 
meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle 
PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a 
proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to 
determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC 
p193 
 
"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective intentionality and they 
function by carrying deontic powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality 
and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that 
have the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the 
explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit. And desires and 
intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or 
perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that sense they are 
supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as 
desires, prior intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind direction of fit. 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like them to be or how we intend to make 
them be...In addition to these two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not 
supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the 
world-relating commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it 
represent with either direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every mental 
representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is 
characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the 
structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the 
world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do 
this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way 
that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but 
at another level the utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it 
is a physical object like any other. At another level it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW 
p74 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is no way you can make 
explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is 
true not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an outline of behavior from 
our two greatest descriptive psychologists.  
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a 
New Century), TLP, PI, OC, WRTI and other books by these two geniuses. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast 
S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the logical extensions of S2 
into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior due to the recent 
evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
Some of W's frequent topics in his 3rd period were the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-`Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner' (WRTI) on how confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and psychology) -- the 
impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like `thinking', `seeing' first 
described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of 
the inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. S1 is the 
simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UOA1 
--Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, 
hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, 
etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in 
terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle and 
Hacker (Human Nature)for good disquisitions on this). 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, true only mental states, while 
slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to 
me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is the 
default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, 
rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC `The Phenomenological 
Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces 
the illusion that we control our life and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization during the next 
150 years. 
I find W's description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works 
to be deeper than S's (or anyone's). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these 
too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without 
involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more revealing examples of language in action than 
anyone, one might say that his aggregate aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most comprehensive 
"theory" of behavior ever penned. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound 
and crystal clear, that he writes telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. I have had to cut the background info to a minimum, so 
those wishing for more please consult my many other reviews on W, S, Hutto, Johnston, etc. 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 
which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) on our thoughts (propositions 
of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of PNC: "Thus saying something and 
meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A 
proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the 
case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function 
causally in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious 
personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in 
certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions 
in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" or DMS's two books on OC (see my 
reviews) as they make clear the difference between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false 
propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S's taking S1 perceptions as propositional 
(at least in some places in his work) since they can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one 
begins thinking about them in S2.  
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one event so for IAA "We have 
different levels of description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in addition to the 
constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and intentions-in-action is that the 
conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action 
while those of IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are mental states (i.e., 
unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action(IAA) which are conscious acts(i.e., S2) but both are 
causally self-referential (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) it is 
essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized 
in Table 2.1, which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have created. In my view 
it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's 
true-only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus CSR references S1 true-only perception, memory and 
intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 
has content and is downwardly causal (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would 
change the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the automatic functioning of 
our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things 
to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and 
decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, 
are totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In 
language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or 
the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often 
orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has 
described as `The Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd period work and from the 
observations of contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of 
System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense 
to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged.  The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential.  
 
His summary of deontics (rights and obligations) on p50 of MSW needs translation. Thus "You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are built, and you have to have the 
collective intentionality of the conversation in order to make the commitment" is much clearer (once you get used 
to my terminology) as "The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) 
which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in S3." 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A function is a cause that serves a 
purpose...In this sense functions are intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
Again I suggest the translation of "The intentionality of language is created by the intrinsic, or mind-independent 
intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in mind that behavior is programmed by 
biology. 
 
S states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is 
basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 
were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy 
before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology 
shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher 
bandwidth information transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of billions and hundreds of millions of 
years of natural selections by inclusive fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague 
talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring 
to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all behavior. As W said many 
times, the most familiar is for that reason invisible. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which means that it is a typical S2 disposition 
which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that 
spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes of S1, while representations are the dispositional 
Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of 
how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever understood it.  
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give 
rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons 
for action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The 
overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of 
which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology who thinks a 
bit can see that this view is not credible. 
 
Here is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: We yield to our desires (need to alter 
brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result 
sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness-IF (increased survival for genes in ourselves 
and those closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen 
defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly 
the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely human. The paradox of how we can 
voluntarily carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 acts and their S3 extension that are desire independent) is that the 
unconscious DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the 
short term personal immediate desires.  Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, 
but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause).  
 
On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading 
this page as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to 
Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in 
Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, 
which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different 
uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be 
useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior 
(LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is 
voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental 
State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, 
truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy)  only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical to 
note that this table is only an highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined 
in its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
 
Now for some comments on Budd's WPP. 
As with all commentary on W, one must keep in mind when it was written and what works were consulted. On his 
death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. Apart from the Tractatus, they were 
unpublished and largely unknown, although some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his 
classes), leading to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences.  Some works are known to have been lost 
and many others W had destroyed.  Most of this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and 
copies were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, like most W commentators of the period, does not reference the 
microfilm.  Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive and appears in some form in his subsequently published 
works (which are referenced by Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and there is substantial material 
that has never been translated from the original German nor published in book form. In 1998 the Bergen CD of the 
complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition 
$2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan and apparently free on the net as well.  Like 
the other CDs of W’s work , it is available from Intelex (www.nlx.com).  It is indexed and searchable and the prime 
W resource.  However, my extensive readings of the W  literature show that very few people have bothered to 
consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical element. One can see Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on 
Godel for one notable exception.  
One major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a book in 2000 is the famous Big 
Typescript. Since Budd finished this book in 1989, neither this nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he 
neglected the Cornell microfilm.  Nevertheless by far the most important works date from W’s 3
rd
 period (ca. 1935 
to 1951) and these were all used by Budd.   
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese German into modern 
English. One must be a master of English, German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his 
works suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where one has to understand the 
whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to translate. Since, in my view, nobody has grasped the full import of 
his later works, one can see why W has yet to be fully appreciated.  Even the more or less well known critical 
difference e.g., between understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an  S1 utterance)  vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 
utterance) in various contexts has never been fully understood (see my review of OC). 
 
The above comments seem to me to be as good a description of higher order behavior as one can find but of 
course it is not completely understood by anyone so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s to have 
grasped it. Like everyone he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our EP and the whole 
framework of W’s and S’s work laid out above was unavailable to him. Nevertheless he does a good job and nicely 
complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed.   
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and the impossibility of a truly private 
language pop up repeatedly (“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this argument are 
extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no 
books and one day decide to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and say 
‘coconut’ again it seems like I have started on a language.  But suppose what I say (since there is no person or 
dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ and the next day something else?  Memory is notoriously fallible 
and we have great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction from others and with incessant 
input from media. This may seem like a trivial point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer—
i.e., our true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable statements regarding 
everything in the world, including our own behavior.  Though W explained this with many examples beginning over 
¾ of a century ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any discussion of behavior 
unless one does.  As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Johnston and others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity 
with Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist excretions that deny our inner life needs to 
go back to the beginning. 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, knowing, believing) which seem like 
they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight.  
Thus on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that is not a mental state and has no 
definite duration like thinking, understanding, believing etc.    
Few notice (Budd p29-32 and Moyal-Sharrock recently are rare exceptions) that W presciently (decades before 
chaos and complexity science came into being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several 
times that the causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state 
of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point 
(p34). Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in 
fact over a century now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” refer again to dispositions 
such as “may think it’s raining” which are possible states of affairs (or potential actions—S’s conditions of 
satisfaction) which may arise in chaos.  It may be useful to tie this to S’s 3 gaps of intentionality which he finds 
critically necessary.   
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something 
consists in.” Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions 
of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can 
be seen as another statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations vs publicly 
testable ones). Likewise with rule following and interpretation on p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable 
acts--no private rules or private interpretations either. And one must note here it is that many (most famously 
Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it’s just 
arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such 
conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the background.  Budd 
correctly rejects this as W’s idea several times (e.g., p58).  
In his next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms 
the true-only undoubtable and untestable background.  His comment (p47)...” that our beliefs about our present 
sensations rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the “myth of the given” is one of the principal objects of 
Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these 
‘beliefs’, but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made very clear, the sensations, 
memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and not subject to belief in the usual sense but are better called 
understandings. Unlike our beliefs (including those in other peoples S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for 
doubt. Budd explains this well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying one is in 
pain. That is, justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 
reflexive fast unconscious processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like everyone 
who discusses W on rules, private language and the inner,  all he needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible 
test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria’.  
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true only causal experiences of S1 and the reasoned dispositions of S2. 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, thoughts etc.) is again that they 
have their use (meaning) and it is the designation of dispositions to act, or in S’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction which make the utterance true.    
Again, his discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that we ‘self ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our 
sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is 
true-only and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different kind than a mistake in S2. And 
S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns reasons, and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or 
jumping out of the way of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets in right again—“So 
the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of 
pain must be caused by a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he experiences 
(p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W would not accept this based on one or two comments in his 
entire corpus, since in his later work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal automated 
nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back to S1 to cause muscle movements (including 
speech). Animals survive only because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are highly 
predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly).  
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how S1 and S2 interact and where our 
language is ambiguous in what we may mean by ‘seeing’.  In general it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is 
part of the slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they are so well integrated 
that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that 
W is exclusively interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., aspectual or S2 higher 
order processing of images. 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of behavior, it is of great value to refer to 
Johnston’s book and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate nature of language.  
In chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—the relations between S1 and S2.  As I 
have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2, framework it 
is not surprising. Thus Budd’s discussion of seeing (unconscious S1) vs visualizing (conscious S2 which is subject to 
the will) is severely hampered. Thus one can understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the 
domination of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there being no test for my inner experiences, 
so whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s face is the image of Jack. Similarly with reading and calculation 
which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes 
where that lack of any test makes them inapplicable.  On p120 et seq. he mentions two of W’s famous examples 
used for combatting this temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had only S2 
calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was not possible.  ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual 
or potential acts—i.e., they are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before one 
really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc.  But we are not taught to do this and so 
we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. 
Hence W’s famous comment (p120)—“The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one we thought quite innocent.” 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the speech itself is our thought and there 
is not some other prior mental process and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument 
for there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we thought before we act (speak).   
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb ‘intend’ is that they would not be 
the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean.  “I 
intend to eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t describe an intention but an 
action and if it meant saying the words (COS is speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it 
function in either case? 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), we can say ‘When it has clear 
COS’ and this means has public truth conditions. Hence the quote from W:  ” When I think in language, there aren’t 
‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought.”  And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other 
possible criterion (COS).  Thus W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet” and 
“Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the 
language.” And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ and that in spite of his 
frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and 
higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
  
It helps greatly in this section on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., of how dispositions like expecting, 
thinking, imagining work-- what it means to utter them)  to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE 
(possible events) which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) which makes it true is that 
Jack arrives and my mental states or physical behavior (pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The 
harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or subsequent behavior or any mental 
states I may have and Budd is confused or at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an 
internal description of a mental state that can agree with reality and that this is the content of a thought, as these 
terms should be restricted to the automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2.  The 
content (meaning) of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that he comes and not any inner 
mental event or state, which the private language argument shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. 
We have very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’.   And as W and S have 
beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the 
thought that Jack will come and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so the answer to the two 
questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be crystal clear—“In virtue of what is it 
true that my expectation does have that content?” and “What has become now of the hollow space and the 
corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. 
For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.”  And thus it should also be quite clear what Budd is 
referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be the required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.”  
Likewise with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my image of Jack is an image of him? 
Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say 
‘YES’ if shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the photo matches the 
vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from 
W: “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI 
p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives 
the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies.”  Hence W’s summation (p140) that “What it always comes 
to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen”… the 
question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event 
stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it.  Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied”…Suppose it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know.”  Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, emotions, change 
of interest etc have no bearing on the way dispositions function.     
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I 
take myself to be-- on the COS that I express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech.  
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is less substance to chapter 7. He 
notes that typically the object and cause are the same—i.e., they are causally self referential—a concept further 
developed by S.  If one looks at my table it is clear they have much more in common with the fast, true-only 
automatisms of S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2 but of course S1 feeds S2 and in turn is often fed 
by it.   
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and designation’ for 
everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation 
of the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of introspection in the 
philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W as I have explained above 
and in my other reviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
